资本主义的未来（下）

SEEDS OF ITS OWN DESTRUCTION

By Martin Wolf 2009-03-10

In a recent ***** Andrew Haldane, the Bank of England's executive director for financial stability, shows how little banks understood of the risks they were supposed to manage. He ascribes these **ilures to “disaster myopia” (the tendency to underestimate risks), a lack of awareness of “network externalities” (spillovers from one institution to the others) and “misaligned incentives” (the upside to employees and the downside to shareholders and taxpayers).

A fter the crisis, we will surely “see finance less proud”, as Winston Churchill desired back in 1925. Markets will impose a brutal, if temporary, discipline. Regulation will also tighten.

Less clear is whether policymakers will contemplate structural remedies: a separation of utility commercial banking from investment banking; or the forced reduction in the size and complexity of institutions deemed too big or interconnected to **il. One could also imagine a return of much banking activity to the home market, as governments increasingly call the tune. If so, this would be “de-globalisation”.

Churchill called also for industry to be “more content”. In the short run, however, the collapse of the financial system is achieving the opposite: a worldwide industrial slump. It is also spreading to every significant sector of the real economy, much of which is clamouring for assistance.

Yet if the financial system has proved dysfunctional, how **r can we rely on the maximisation of shareholder value as the way to guide business? The bulk of shareholdings is, after all, controlled by financial institutions. Events of the past 18 months must confirm the folly of this idea. It is better, many will conclude, to let managers determine the direction of their companies than let financial players or markets override them.

A likely result will be an increased willingness by governments to protect companies from active shareholders – hedge funds, private equity and other investors. As a defective financial sector loses its credibility, the legitimacy of the market process itself is damaged. This is particularly true of the free-wheeling “Anglo-Saxon” approach.

No less likely are big changes in monetary policy. The macroeconomic consensus had been in **vour of a separation of responsibility for monetary and fiscal policy, the placing of fiscal policy on autopilot, independence of central banks and the orientation of monetary decisions towards targeting inflation. But with interest rates close to zero, the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy vanishes. More fundamental is the challenge to the decision to ignore asset prices in the setting of monetary policy.

Many argue that Mr Greenspan, who succeeded Mr Volcker, created the conditions for both bubbles and subsequent collapse. He used to argue that it would be easier to clean up after the bursting of a bubble than identify such a bubble in real time and then prick it. In a reassessment of the doctrine last November, Donald Kohn, Fed vice-chairman, restated the orthodox position, but with a degree of discomfort.

Mr Kohn now states that “in light of the demonstrated importance to the real economy of speculative booms and busts (which can take years to play out), central banks probably should always try to look out over a long horizon when evaluating the economic outlook and deliberating about the appropriate accompanying path of the policy rate”. Central banks will have to go further, via either monetary policy or regulatory instruments.

Y et a huge financial crisis, together with a deep global recession, if not something **r worse, is going to have much wider effects than just these.

Remember what happened in the Great Depression of the 1930s. Unemployment rose to one-quarter of the labour force in important countries, including the US. This transformed capitalism and the role of government for half a century, even in the liberal democracies. It led to the collapse of liberal trade, fortified the credibility of socialism and communism and shifted many policymakers towards import substitution as a development strategy.

The Depression led also to xenophobia and authoritarianism. Frightened people become tribal: dividing lines open within and between societies. In 1930, the Nazis won 18 per cent of the German vote; in 1932, at the height of the Depression, their share had risen to 37 per cent.

One transformation that can already be seen is in attitudes to pay. Even the US and UK are exerting direct control over pay levels and structures in assisted institutions. From the inconceivable to the habitual has taken a year. Equally obvious is a wider shift in attitudes towards inequality: vast rewards were acceptable in return for exceptional competence; as compensation for costly incompetence, they are intolerable. Marginal tax rates on the wealthier are on the way back up.

Yet another impact will be on the sense of insecurity. The credibility of moving pension savings from government-run pay-as-you-go systems to market-based systems will be **r smaller than before, even though, ironically, the opportunity for profitable long-term investment has risen. Politics, like markets, overshoot.

The search for security will strengthen political control over markets. A shift towards politics entails a shift towards the national, away from the global. This is already evident in finance. It is shown too in the determination to rescue national producers. But protectionist intervention is likely to extend well beyond the cases seen so **r: these are still early days.

The impact of the crisis will be particularly hard on emerging countries: the number of people in extreme poverty will rise, the size of the new middle class will **ll and governments of some indebted emerging countries will surely de**ult. Confidence in local and global elites, in the market and even in the possibility of material progress will weaken, with potentially devastating social and political consequences. Helping emerging economies through a crisis for which most have no responsibility whatsoever is a necessity.

The ability of the west in general and the US in particular to influence the course of events will also be damaged. The collapse of the western financial system, while China's flourishes, marks a humiliating end to the “uni- polar moment”. As western policymakers struggle, their credibility lies broken. Who still trusts the teachers?

These changes will endanger the ability of the world not just to manage the global economy but also to cope with strategic challenges: fragile states, terrorism, climate change and the rise of new great powers. At the extreme, the integration of the global economy on which almost everybody now depends might be reversed. Globalisation is a choice. The integrated economy of the decades before the first world war collapsed. It could do so again.

On June 19 2007, I concluded an article on the “new capitalism” with the observation that it remained “untested”. The test has come: it **iled. The era of financial liberalisation has ended. Yet, unlike in the 1930s, no credible alternative to the market economy exists and the habits of international co-operation are deep.

“I've a feeling we're not in Kansas any more,” said Dorothy after a tornado dropped her, her house and dog in the land of Oz. The world of the past three decades has gone. Where we end up, after this financial tornado, is for us to seek to determine.

 

资本主义的未来（下）

英国《金融时报》首席经济事务评论员马丁·沃尔夫(Martin Wolf) 2009-03-10

 

在最近的一篇论文中，英国央行(Bank of England)金融稳定事务执行董事安德鲁•霍尔丹(Andrew Haldane)指出了银行对其应管理的风险的理解有多么的少。他将这些失败归咎于“灾难短视”(disaster myopia，指倾向于低估风险)、缺乏对“网络外部性”(network externalities，从一家机构对其它机构的溢出效应)的认识以及“不协调激励措施”(misaligned incentives，对员工有利，对股东和纳税人不利)。

此次危机过后，我们肯定“不会那么自豪地看待金融，就像1925年邱吉尔所渴望的那样。市场将制定严酷（即便是暂时的）的纪律。监管也会加强。

不太明确的一点是，决策者是否将考虑结构性补救措施：将多功能商业银行业务与投行业务分离；或者被迫缩减被视为规模太大或关联性过于紧密而不能破产的机构的规模和复杂性。有人可能还会设想，随着政府发挥越来越大的主导作用，大量银行业活动将回归本国市场。如果这样，将出现“放松全球化”(de-globalisation)。

此外，邱吉尔还要求工业要变得“更知足”。然而，短期来看，金融体系的崩溃正带来相反的结果：全球性工业下滑。此外，这正蔓延到实体经济的所有重要领域，其中许多行业正大声呼唤援助。

然而，如果金融体系被证明为功能紊乱，那么我们能在多大程度上依赖股东价值最大化，作为引导企业的方法呢？毕竟，大多数股权掌握在金融机构手中。过去18个月的事件肯定证实了这一观点的愚蠢之处。许多人会总结道，相对于让金融参与者或市场凌驾于公司之上，让公司管理者决定公司的方向是更佳做法。

可能的结果是，政府保护公司不受活跃股东袭击的意愿增强，这些股东包括对冲基金、私人股本及其它投资者。随着有缺陷的金融业丧失其可信度，市场进程的合理性也受到影响。 自由的“盎格鲁-撒克逊”式策略尤其如此。

货币政策发生重大变化的可能性也很大。宏观经济共识一直支持货币和财政政策责任分离、让财政政策自动发挥作用、央行**以及令货币政策转向针对通胀。但由于利率已接近零，货币和财政政策之间的区别已消失。更根本的是挑战在制定货币政策过程中忽视资产价格的决定。

许多人辩称，接替沃尔克的格林斯潘为泡沫以及随后泡沫的破裂创造了条件。他曾主张，相对于及时发现泡沫并戳破它，在泡沫破裂后收拾残局更容易一些。在去年11月对这一理论重新进行评价时，美联储副主席唐纳德•科恩(Donald Kohn)重申了这一传统看法，不过他流露出了一丝不自在。

科恩现在指出，“考虑到投机性繁荣与萧条（这可能要经历数年时间完成）对实体经济明显的重要性，在评估经济前景以及就伴随而来的合理的政策利率道路进行讨论时，央行可能应努力长期保持警惕”。央行必须更进一步，要么通过货币政策，要么通过监管工具。

然而，巨大的金融危机，再加上严重的全球衰退（如果不是更糟糕的话），将造成远比这些更为广泛的影响。

记住上世纪30年代大萧条(Great Depression)时期所发生的事情吧。失业人数增至包括美国在内的重要国家总人口的四分之一。这彻底改变了长达半个世纪的资本主义以及政府的作用，甚至在自由主义民主国家。这导致自由贸易崩溃、社会主义和共产主义的可信度增强并令许多决策者转向进口替代，作为一项发展战略。

 

大萧条还带来了仇外情绪和威权主义。被吓坏的人们变得封闭起来：他们在社会内部以及不同社会之间公开划清界限。1930年，德国纳粹赢得了德国民众18%的选票；1932年，在大萧条高潮时期，这一数字曾升至37%。

一个已经能看到的改变是对薪酬的态度。甚至连美国和英国都正对接受援助的机构的薪资水平和结构进行直接控制。从无法想象到变成习惯用了一年时间。同样明显的是，对不平等的态度发生了更大变化：作为能力出众的回报，巨额酬金是可以接受的；但作为对代价高昂的不胜任的补偿，那是无法忍受的。对较富裕人士征收的边际税率正再度上升。

然而，另外一个影响是在不安全感方面。把养老储蓄从政府管理的现收现付(pay-as-you-go)体系转移到基于市场的体系，其可信度将远远不如以前。但讽刺的是，尽管如此，长期投资获利的机会却增加了。与市场一样，政治也做过了头。

对安全感的追寻将加强政治对市场的控制。转向政治必须伴随着转向国内，而远离国际。在金融业，这一点已非常明显。决心援救国内生产商的做法也证明了这点。但保护主义干预可能会远远超越目前我们所看到的例子：现在还为时尚早。

这场危机对于新兴市场的影响将尤为严重：极度贫困人口数量将增加、新兴中产阶层的规模将减小、同时一些背负债务的新兴国家的政府肯定会违约。人们对于本国和全球精英的信心、对于市场甚至重大进展的可能性的信心将下滑，这将对社会和政治造成潜在的破坏性影响。多数新兴经济体对这场危机毫无责任，帮助它们摆脱危机是必要的。

整个西方世界（尤其是美国）影响事件发展的能力也将遭到破坏。西方金融体系的崩溃（而中国的金融体系则在蓬勃发展）标志着“单极时刻”的结束，这令人羞愧。由于西方决策者步履维艰，他们的可信度也遭到了破坏。谁还相信这些老师？

这些变化将危及世界管理全球经济并应对战略性挑战的能力：脆弱的国家政权、恐怖主义、气候变化以及新兴大国的崛起。从极端意义上来说，几乎所有人现在都依赖的全球经济一体化可能会出现倒退。全球化是一种选择。第一次世界大战以前历时几十年的一体化经济陷于崩溃。现在这可能会再次发生。

2007年6月19日，我就“新资本主义”撰写了一篇文章，我注意到，它仍“未经受考验”。如今考验已经来临：它失败了。金融自由化的时代已经结束。然而，与上世纪30年代不同，现在市场经济的可靠替代品并不存在，国际合作的习惯根深蒂固。

“我感觉，我们所处的地方已不再是堪萨斯了。”桃乐茜(Dorothy，译者注：《绿野仙踪》童话故事中的女主角)说道，此前一场龙卷风把她、她的房子以及她的狗吹到了奥兹城(OZ)。过去30年的世界已消失。在这次金融龙卷风过后，我们将降落至何处，这是我们希望确定的事情。

译者/何黎